this technique is that the reliability and bias of the rater may be estimated by comparing his ratings of standard tape-recorded interviews with those made by 12 'experts', experienced users of the interview (Fleiss et al. 1965) . A separate analysis of the correlations between 22 features selected from the MSS substantially reproduced the clusters derived from the Newcastle inventory. Since the interviewer (T J F) had a coefficient of reliability of 092 and negligible bias compared with the 'experts' in New York (Endicott 1966, personal communication) , it is unlikely that the data from the Newcastle inventory were generated solely by clinical preconception.
Heuristic Value
Discrepancies with previous hospital studies should help in setting limits to the generality of hypotheses founded on hospital populations. Preliminary impressions are that the factor patterns are significantly related to patterns of seeking and obtaining medical care in general practice, as well as to short-term outcome. The data suggest that the material is neither homogeneous nor explicable in terms of a simple dichotomy. We anticipate that these data will enhance the value of a longer follow up of this cohort of patients, now in the planning stage.
(The Institute ofPsychiatry, London),
The Continuum Model of Depressive Illness
During the last five years Professor Roth and his colleagues in Newcastle have published a series of papers in which they have sought to demonstrate that, by utilizing modem statistical techniques, discrete disease entities or syndromes can be identified amidst the confusing variety ofthe affective illnesses, Kiloh & Garside (1963) and Camey et al. (1965) demonstrated that factor analysis of clinical data from series of depressed patients yielded bipolar factors distinguishing between the typical features of endogenous depressionlike retardation and early morning wakeningand the typical features of reactive depressionlike psychological precipitation and hysterical personality traits. Carney and his co-workers also demonstrated that a consecutive series of patients with depressive illnesses could be shown to consist of two quite distinct populations by deriving a bimodal distribution curve from a discriminant function analysis. Recently Gurney and her colleagues have extended these studies of depressive illnesses to the whole gamut of affective states and claim to have demonstrated that the majority of patients fall neatly into one of four categories, endogenous depression, neurotic depression, anxiety state and Roth's (1959) 'phobic anxiety depersonalization syndrome' , Roth 1969 ). The results of these studies are consistent with one another and are based on a commendable variety of patient populations; Carney's patients were'consecutive admissions to hospital for ECT, Kiloh & Garside's were outpatients and Fahy has now studied a series of patients seen in general practice (Fahy et al. 1969) .
Unfortunately, there are reasons for treating these claims by the Newcastle school with caution in spite of their attractive simplicity. Many different workers, in Sweden, in the USA and in Australia, as well as in this country, have tried to elucidate the classification of depressive states in broadly similar ways: none has succeeded in obtaining such clear-cut results. Moreover, those workers who have tried to replicate the studies of the Newcastle school have failed to do so. McConaghy factor, they failed to obtain any factor which could be identified with either neurotic or endogenous depression or which discriminated between the two. Even more disconcerting, other workers who have calculated the diagnosis scores described by Carney et al. (1965) for their own series of patients have failed to obtain the bimodal distribution of scores that is the basis of the claim that two distinct populations are present. Hemsi, Kendell & McClure obtained a perfectly unimodal distribution of scores for a series of 130 patients, in spite of using exactly the same weightings and definitions as Carney. As Fig I shows , the difference between the two distribution curves could hardly be more striking; patients w ith scores between +3 and +8 are rare in the Newcastle series; in the other they form the peak of the curve. More recently Hakki (1968, personal communication) has studied a further series of 57 patients at Runwell Hospital and he also has failed to obtain any semblance of a bimodal distribution of diagnosis scores.
Apart from this lack of agreement between different workers there are other more fundamental problems associated with the use of factor analysis. The majority of workers in this field have contented themselves with deriving a number of factors from a correlation matrix and then identifying these factors by inspection of their loadings. But factors only portray relationships between symptoms whereas classification is concerned with relationships between patients, and the former cannot be assumed to imply the latter. Kiloh & Garside were not justified in concluding as they did that their bipolar factor, which discriminated between the characteristic symptoms of endogenous depression and those of reactive depression, demonstrated that endogenous and reactive depression were distinct disease entities. This conclusion would only have been justified had they demonstrated that the majority of patients obtained either very high or very low scores on this factor and that patients with intermediate scores were relatively infrequent. But this they failed to do.
The importance of this distinction between the loadings of symptoms and the scores of patients on a factor is illustrated by a comparison of Table  1 and Fig 2. Table I shows a pair of higher order factors derived from a principal component analysis of data from a series of 696 depressed patients (Kendell 1968a) . They portray almost uncontaminated profiles of neurotic and psychotic depression in much the same way as Kiloh & Garside's bipolar factor; indeed they can readily be reduced to a single bipolar factor, though there is no advantage in doing so. But when the scores Table 1 Higher order factors derived from a principal component analysis of data from 696 patients -2-0 -0 S patients rather than in the raters, but in another * recent study (Kendell 1968b ) the author was able to eliminate this possibility and demonstrate unequivocally that the clinical ratings made on a * series of depressed patients by a group of 22 registrars varied significantly and systematically with their views on classification. Those who believed in the existence of distinct psychotic and * neurotic forms and those for whom such distinco O tions were meaningless each tended to elicit pat-* . . Table 1 . The dotted line provides the best discrimination possible between the psychotic and neurotic groups of the patients on these two factors are plotted against one another (Fig 2) there is little tendency for them to fall into two distinct clusters; the neat separation of symptoms into two covariant clusters is not accompanied by any significant discrimination between patients.
A further, more intractable problem concerns the clinical ratings from which all these statistical analyses are derived. The work of Thomdike (1920) and others has shown that ratings, both of behaviour and of character traits, are liable to be biased by raters' global concepts or stereotypes concerning their subjects. This so-called 'halo effect' affects the ratings of experienced and inexperienced raters alike and it must be assumed that our clinical ratings are liable to be biased in the same way, particularly when so many of the concepts we uselike 'adequate previous personality' and 'hysterical features' -are vague and ill defined. The difference between the two histograms in Fig 1 provides a striking example of the extent to which the ratings of different psychiatrists, apparently rating similar patients by the same criteria, may diverge from one another and suggests that the halo effect may be a major cause of the disagreements which have been so prominent a feature of our attempts to improve our systems of classification. In this case it could, perhaps, be argued that the difference lies in the At the risk of overstatement I would suggest that our persistent failure to resolve the apparently straightforward issue of whether or not discrete forms of depression are to be found is due in large measure to our failure to appreciate the extent to which our perceptions and judgments are at the mercy of our preconceptions. If this is so, this controversy, and others like it, will presumably continue until we take steps to combat these halo effects. Probably they cannot be eliminated entirely, short of relying on patients' own self-ratings. But it is a reasonable assumption that they would be reduced considerably if the traditional free-ranging clinical interview were to be replaced for research purposes by rigorously standardized interviews in which the order and content of the interviewer's questions and the criteria for assessing the patients' replies were both prescribed.
All that has been said so far is essentially negative; a sceptical and uninspiring recital of reasons for doubting the findings of others and questioning their conclusions. But one of the most important reasons why psychiatrists continue to search for discrete disease entities amongst the depressive illnesses is that the traditional alternativethat of abjuring all attempt at classification and distinguishing only between different grades of severity and chronicityis so patently unsatisfactory. In essence, the situation we are confronted with is this. When separate populations of endogenous and reactive depressives are compared they differ in almost every respectin premorbid personality, in symptomatology, in response to ECT and the tricyclic drugs and in prognosis; they also differ on many physiological variables, like sedation threshold and salivation rate. Moreover, several factor analytic studies, those of Rosenthal & Klerman (1966) , Hamilton (1967 ), Rosenthal & Gudeman (1967 , and Kendell (1968a) , as well as those of Kiloh and Carney, have all suggested that the endogenous/ reactive, or psychotic/neurotic, axis is the single most important dimension of symptomatology in
On the other hand, numerous attempts over forty years have failed to demonstrate the presence of two distinct populations. The pure forms are always outnumbered by mixed forms, even when discriminatory potential is maximized by statistical techniques like canonical variate analysis.
The simplest representational model for this sort of situation is that of a continuum, with the classical endogenous depressions at one pole, the classical reactive depressions at the other and the majority of patients disposed in between. Some such model as this has, of course, long been implicit in the writings and teaching of several English psychiatrists. What is new is that we now possess an accurate means of identifying the position of individual patients on the continuum. Both the 'diagnosis score' described by Carney and his colleagues and the author's analogous 'diagnostic index score' in effect do just this, in the same way that an intelligence quotient identifies an individual's position on the continuum of intelligence.
These diagnosis scores are derived in two stages. In the first stage weights are allocated to a large number of potentially relevant symptoms by means of a discriminant function analysis in such a way as accurately to reflect their discriminatory value. Symptoms highly characteristic of endogenous depression, like retardation and early morning wakening, obtain large positive weights; those characteristic of reactive depression, like self-pity and reactivity, obtain large negative weights; and those found to have little diagnostic significance, like suicidal feelings and obsessional symptoms, obtain small or negligible weights. In the second stage the weights of the symptoms of each individual patient are added together to produce a single score for that patient. If many typical endogenous symptoms are present this 'diagnosis score' will be large and positive, if many typical reactive symptoms are present it will be negative, and if both endogenous and reactive symptoms are present it will be close to zero, because the positive and negative weights will tend to cancel one another out.
The sort of way in which diagnosis scores can be used in practice is illustrated by Table 2 . This shows the relationship, in over a thousand patients, between treatment and outcome and a set of five diagnosis score categories. In Table 3 the corresponding relationships are shown for the same patients when classified into the three conventional diagnostic categories (Kendell 1968a ). The mean outcome rating is derived from a rating of outcome on a five-point scale: 1 for recovered; 2 or 3 for different degrees of improvement; 4 for unchanged and 5 for worse. It can be seen that there is a smooth linear relationship between diagnosis score and outcome, each increase in diagnosis score being matched by a corresponding improvement in outcome. The same is true of patients' liability to receive ECT; each increase in diagnosis score is accompanied by an increase in the proportion of patients treated with ECT. And the same is true of response to ECT. Those with the lowest diagnosis scores respond worst, those with intermediate scores respond rather better, and those with high diagnosis scores respond best of all. For all three parameters the difference between the two ends of the continuum is much greater than that between any of the three traditional diagnostic categories. Moreover, if one equates negative diagnosis scores with neurotic depression (a negative score necessarily implies that neurotic symptoms predominate over psychotic ones) and positive diagnosis scores with psychotic depression there are bigger differences in outcome within both the psychotic and the neurotic territories than there are across the boundary between the two. It follows from this that a patient's diagnosis score provides more information about response to treatment and outcome, as well as about symptomatology, than does the traditional diagnosis; to say that a patient has a depressive illness with a diagnosis score of +4 is more informative than saying that he has a psychotic depression.
Earlier an analogy was drawn between a diagnosis score and an intelligence quotient. This analogy can fruitfully be carried further. We could if we wished distinguish variations in Table 2 The relationship between treatment and outcome and diagnostic ihdex score in 1,080 patients intelligence by allocating everyone to one or other of two categories, the clever and the stupid. In fact we do not, for two reasons. First, because most people are not particularly clever or particularly stupid and we would be at a loss to know which of the two categories to place them in. And secondly, because there are different degrees of cleverness and stupidity which it is important for us to distinguish. So instead of using a dichotomous classification we use a continuum model and identify each individual's position on the continuum by means of an IQ. Exactly the same arguments apply to depressive illnesses. Many depressions are not obviously endogenous or obviously reactive and so we are often uncertain which category to choose. Indeed, the distinction between the two has been shown by Kreitman and his colleagues (1961) to be the commonest of all sources of diagnostic disagreement between psychiatrists. Furthermore, different degrees of psychoticism or neuroticism are associated with important differences in response to treatment and outcome, as Tables 2 and 3 illustrate, and these differences are lost in a dichotomous classification. The inference seems clear. We would do better to abandon our two either/or categories and instead to identify each patient by means of a diagnosis score.
If distinguishing between psychotic and neurotic depressions met some clear practical need it might still be sensible to accept the drawbacks, but no such justification exists. The traditional justification for the distinction was always that it was 'of extreme importance, not only for treatment but for prognosis' (Gillespie 1930) or 'vital to rational therapy' (Mayer-Gross 1954) . But these confident claims have been refuted both by Nystr6m (1965) in Sweden and by Carney, Roth & Garside themselves. The Newcastle workers predicted their patients' response to ECT both on the basis of their diagnostic dichotomy and, independently, on the basis of the patients' symptoms, using weightings derived from a multiple regression analysis. Nystrom used a similar method in a study of 188 patients in Lund. Both found that response to ECT was predicted more accurately directly from the symptomatology than it was from the diagnosis.
The continuum model has a further advantage to recommend it: it preserves the most firmly held beliefs of both the separatists and the unifiers, the protagonists of the original controversy, and so holds out some hope of effecting a reconciliation between the two. Gillespie, Ross and Mayer-Gross were always concerned primarily with the differences, in symptomatology, treatment and outcome, between the traditional neurotic and psychotic stereotypes. These differences are not disputed; they are preserved as the two poles of the continuum. Mapother and Lewis, on the other hand, were always more concerned with the impossibility of drawing a sharp distinction between the two. Recognition of this impossibility is fundamental to the concept of a continuum. Often in the history of science a long controversy has been terminated only by the realization that the two contestants had grasped different aspects of the same truth. It may be that this long controversy over the classification of depressions has something of the same quality.
The most important disadvantage of the continuum model is its novelty. It introduces a concept of diagnosis which is foreign to most physicians, and this may well militate against its acceptance. But we must accept that the disease entity concept we have inherited from the nineteenth century ceases to be appropriate if the underlying causes of the behavioural abnormalities we are concerned with are graded traits, capable of being present in varying quantity and varying combinations, rather than qualitative deviations from normality which can only be either present or absent. As yet we know little about the fundamental causes of depressions and we are largely dependent on clinical data which do not reveal discrete entities. The classification we use now must be that which is best suited to the data in our possession, and the concept of a psychotic/neurotic continuum, though it hardly does justice to the great wealth of clinical variation embraced by the depressive illnesses, does less violence to the facts than any simple alternative.
